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a b s t r a c t
Modern society depends on the smooth functioning of critical infrastructures which provide services of
fundamental importance, e.g. telecommunications and water supply. These infrastructures may suffer
from faults/malfunctions coming e.g. from aging effects or they may even comprise targets of terrorist
attacks. Prompt detection and accommodation of these situations is of paramount signiﬁcance.
This paper proposes a probabilistic modeling scheme for analyzing malicious events appearing in
interdependent critical infrastructures. The proposed scheme is based on modeling the relationship
between datastreams coming from two network nodes by means of a hidden Markov model (HMM)
trained on the parameters of linear time-invariant dynamic systems which estimate the relationships
existing among the speciﬁc nodes over consecutive time windows. Our study includes an energy
network (IEEE 30 model bus) operated via a telecommunications infrastructure.
The relationships among the elements of the network of infrastructures are represented by an HMM
and the novel data is categorized according to its distance (computed in the probabilistic space) from the
training ones. We considered two types of cyber-attacks (denial of service and integrity/replay) and
report encouraging results in terms of false positive rate, false negative rate and detection delay.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Modern critical infrastructures (CI) include numerous elements
for facilitating different functions of a society and its economy. A CI is
an infrastructure, the smooth operation of which is essential to
maintain the quality of life and safety of the citizens as well as it
economic security. CIs include but are not limited to: telecommuni-
cations, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transporta-
tion, banking and ﬁnance, transportation, water supply systems,
emergency services (including medical, ﬁre, and rescue), etc.
Interdependent networks include identiﬁable industries, institu-
tions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities
that provide a reliable ﬂow of products and services is one the ﬁrst
priorities in the governmental agendas and policy makers. In principle,
these systems may produce homogeneous (e.g. only voltage) or
heterogeneous (e.g. power and information ﬂow) measurements.
The trend suggests that the size of these networks is increasing in
order to facilitate information gathering regarding the monitoring
environment and satisfy the overall service demand. However, the
increased size raises the complexity of the overall network and
burdens real-time data processing. On top of that, not rarely, CIs suffer
from various kinds of faults (component malfunctions, drifts, commu-
nication faults, power loss, etc.), which affect the performance of the
system in a direct way. In such cases, prompt detection and isolation
are of paramount importance towards avoiding information loss and/
or misinterpretation of the ongoing situation.
In addition CIs may be targets of attacks (either direct or
remote) aiming to disrupt their smooth functionality. The con-
sequences of an infrastructure failing may not affect only the
speciﬁc infrastructure while it has societal, health, and economic
impact. Attacks on the cyber part of a Cyber-Physical (C-P) system
can produce effects ranging from sporadic disruptions of ﬁeld
devices (sensors and actuators) to large scale outages or even loss
of control in the case of a compromised industrial control system
or an extended Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack [1,2].
This work is concentrated on the automatic processing of
datastreams coming from interdependent infrastructures with
emphasis on the analysis of malicious events. The particular
problematic is close to the scientiﬁc area of Fault Detection and
Isolation (FDI), or simpler, fault diagnosis. It typically includes the
detection of the fault (which refers to the time instant which the
fault occurred) and its isolation (which refers to the location of the
occurred fault). Fault identiﬁcation corresponds to determining
the nature of the detected and isolated fault, and is quite
signiﬁcant since it may provide useful information for designing
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a proper accommodation strategy to minimize or even eliminate
the consequences of the fault. The link of fault identiﬁcation has
not been explored so extensively as the other links of the fault
diagnosis processing chain, such as fault detection, isolation and
accommodation/reconﬁguration [3,4]. Identiﬁcation follows detec-
tion and typically constitutes a selection of a speciﬁc kind of fault fi
out of an a-priori known set of faults F ¼ ff 1; f 2;…; f Zg, where Z is
the total number of fault types. Selection is made based on the
observation of a speciﬁc symptom(s) or a sequence of them, while
the classiﬁer learns to associate them with a fault f iAF .
This article proposes a methodology for identifying malicious
events on CIs without the need of an analytical model while
considering the cases of an erroneous fault detection. To this end
the overall network state is captured by means of a correlation
map. The method is an extension of the modeling part of [5] while
the approach presented here exploits the probabilistic space. We
model the relationships between the datastreams coming from a
CI using a hidden Markov model (HMM) trained on the parameters
of linear time invariant (LTI) models estimating the relationships.
Subsequently the faulty data are automatically annotated based on
distance on the probabilistic space between the likelihoods
observed during training and the ones computed online. The
probability is a metric showing how probable it is that the speciﬁc
data sequence was generated by the particular HMM. The rationale
behind the usage of our approach comes from the fact that an
HMM operating on the LTI space is able to address the nonlinea-
rities existing within the dataset. Concurrently the system is able
to understand whether there is a bias in the model since it relies
on likelihoods based on a group of models. Overall our approach
can identify whether the data belong to the fault-free situation or
a malicious one while the emphasis is placed on cyber attacks.
The main aspect of our attack scenarios is that a malicious user
initiates a cyber attack against the ICT network by limiting the
communication/network bandwidth. One of our main goals is to
monitor and measure the outcomes in a more realistic aspect than
the total simulated by including the emulation of the cyber part.
Unlike [6] this work focuses on the applicability of the HMM
technique on an experimental test-bed composed of a simulated
and an emulated environment.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
an analysis of the fault identiﬁcation literature focused on CIs. Next,
Section 3 describes the joint usage of LTI and HMM for modeling the
relationship between two datastreams and Section 4 explains the
algorithm for identifying malicious states. Section 5 describes the
emulator platform which was used in our experiments. In Section 6
we explain the experimental set-up, the scenarios and the obtained
results. Finally the last section includes the conclusions of this work.
2. Related literature
The fault identiﬁcation component is without a doubt of high
importance for accommodating effectively the consequences of a
potential fault. However it is not so well explored with respect to
other Fault Diagnosis System's (FDS) components. Most approaches
are based on an analytical mathematical model which characterizes
the process under monitoring [7]. Thus they are subject to the
accuracy of this model, and in the case of complex systems working
under adverse real-world conditions it is not only complicated but
sometimes non-realistic to derive a reliable model.
Computational intelligence methods [4] can be employed in
order to overcome this obstacle. These methods can be based on
quantitative (numerical) and/or qualitative (symbolic) information
about the process of interest. Qualitative information is used in [8]
where a fault-tree analysis was designed as an analytical trouble-
shooting tool by a team of knowledgeable managers, engineers,
and technicians. Fault tree analysis is also used by Crosetti [9] with
a probability evaluation scheme. Fuzzy if-then relations have also
been used in the fault diagnosis domain. Dexter [10] created fuzzy
reference models to describe the symptoms of both faulty and
fault-free plant operation and subsequently used them to identify
whether the system is operating correctly or a particular fault is
present.
Even though qualitative computational intelligent approaches
are effective, the derivation of accurate rules and/or fuzzy if-then
relations is difﬁcult, not to mention time-consuming and costly in
case domain experts are involved. This makes them impractical for
many engineering applications. Thus methods which can learn
these rules “hidden” within large datasets are employed with
neural networks constituting the primary tool due to their
universal non-linear function approximation property [11]. Neural
networks can model the behavior of a given system based on its
produced input-output data. A work which employs NNs is
reported in [12] where both artiﬁcial and real-world data were
used to train NN agents for classifying between different motor
bearing faults through the measurement and interpretation of
motor bearing vibration signatures. Fault diagnosis in non-linear
dynamic systems based on neural networks is described in [13].
This work uses a multi-layer perceptron network trained to predict
the future system states based on the current system inputs and
states. Afterwards, a neural network is trained to classify char-
acteristics contained in the residuals and essentially perform fault
identiﬁcation.
Several works in the literature aim at exploiting the merits of both
qualitative and quantitative approaches. Yu et al. [14] exploits ana-
lytical redundancy via parity equation while neural networks are
then used to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio of the residual and to
isolate different faults. This methodology is applied for fault detection
and isolation for a hydraulic test rig. Ming et al. [15] proposes the
usage of multilevel ﬂowmodels and ANN to develop a fault diagnosis
system, with the intention of improving both identiﬁcation and
understandability of the diagnostic process and results. A feedfor-
ward ANN trained with the BP algorithm is employed and when the
faults are localized a diagnosis is performed by ANNs for either
conﬁrming the faults or offer an alternative solution and/or detailed
information about the possible root cause. The application scenario is
a Nuclear Power Plants simulator.
2.1. The case of critical infrastructures
The literature includes a variety of solutions for fault detection
in infrastructures. However these are of limited-scope and address
a relatively narrow part of the problem space. Shames et al. [16]
proposes the usage of a bank of observers via a model-based fault
diagnosis method, where a set of residuals is generated indicating
the presence of a fault. A model is created which explains the
nominal state of the system while the detector evaluates the
discrepancy between its estimates and the actual measurements.
A fault is detected when the discrepancy is over a threshold. The
authors employed artiﬁcial data to provide illustrative examples of
how their methodology may be applied on power networks which
can be thought as very complex infrastructures in which gen-
erators and loads are dynamically interconnected. Villez et al. [17]
provides a basis for the integration of diverse Fault Detection and
Isolation (FDI) methods as well as optimal coupling of FDI and
control modules in the closed-loop supervisory control system.
Furthermore it gives the expected impact and perspectives of the
proposed Bayesian fusion schema without reporting experimental
results. The authors of [18] investigate the interactions existing
between infrastructure systems which may lead to increased or
decreased risk of failure in each individual system. To this end they
employ a set of diverse models for formulating appropriate risk
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assessment tools. A power transmission grid is used as an example
focusing on blackout dynamics, while data is generated both by a
probabilistic and a dynamical model.
Bovenzi et al. [19] proposes an anomaly-based approach for the
online detection of faults based on Statistical Predictor and Safety
Margin (SPS). The proposed SPS anomaly detection algorithm has
been applied on the Air Trafﬁc Management domain. Their algo-
rithm is compared with a relatively simple one which adopts static
thresholds on a dataset coming from the SWIM-BOXs 1 which
includes various types of parameters such as syscall errors, signals,
and scheduling time of processes. An interesting work is presented
in [20] where the emphasis is placed on identifying and discrimi-
nating attacks and faults under the scope of improving the security
of Electric Power Control Systems. The methodology is based on a
set of rules discovered by using the Rough Sets Classiﬁcation
Algorithm. The authors intent to experiment using the network
model IEEE RTS-96 [21] in an electric power simulator. A fuzzy-
neural data fusion system aiming at increased state-awareness of
resilient control systems is reported in [22]. A data fusion
mechanism is associated with each component of the control
system. Furthermore, each mechanism is composed three layers
(a) conventional threshold-based alarms, (b) anomalous behavior
detector using self-organizing maps, and (c) prediction error based
alarms using neural network based signal forecasting. Experimen-
tal results are derived using data coming from a Matlab Simulink
model of the Idaho National Laboratory Hytest process, which is a
testing facility for hybrid energy systems composed of tightly-
coupled chemical processes [23].
A quite interesting as well as new direction is presented in [24]
which explains the development of a terrorist attack prediction model
using dynamic Bayesian networks. The network is able to provide a
likelihood of future terrorist activities at critical transportation infra-
structure facilities. However only its theoretical development is
presented and its potential effectiveness is demonstrated by two
examples where the aim is to predict a terrorist strike with the
possibility of an airplane hijack at a typical U.S. airport.
An SVM based anomaly detection algorithm is described in
[25]. It uses the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for automatically
estimating the SVM parameters. The authors conducted experi-
ments on two telecommunication network data sets for detecting
undesired events while their evaluation is solely qualitative.
The same problematic from another point of view is given in
[26] which presents two approaches for gaining knowledge which
might be proven useful when designing critical infrastructures,
while the problem is put under the umbrella of reliability and
vulnerability analysis. Nan et al. [27] explains the interdependen-
cies between two exemplary systems (SCADA and SUC) using a
modiﬁed ﬁve-step methodical framework. Based on this analysis,
the paper suggests methods for improving the system perfor-
mance. The article [28] provides a comprehensive description of
the interactions between public policy, managerial decision-
making and the engineering of critical infrastructures while [29]
analyses the background and recent applications of stochastic
point processes in reliability analysis.
To the best of our knowledge there is no approach in the
literature using the probability space of a group of HMMs for
assessing the state of interdependent critical infrastructures. Most
approaches in the literature are qualitative and based on analytical
models of the underlying process. With an HMM operating on the
parameter space we are able to work on generic datastreams for
capturing data redundancies while addressing potential nonlinea-
rities. In addition we propose the usage of a correlation map giving
us the ability to assess the network state using data coming from
fewer nodes. Furthermore our experiments are not simulated but
we employed a powerful emulation platform (Section 5). The
overall aim is to provide recommendations on how monitoring
strategies should be deployed in order to contribute towards
increasing the overall resilience of the network.
3. Modeling the relationships between datastreams
This section explains the method used for modeling the relation-
ships between datastreams coming from correlated sensors, meaning
that the pattern of the relationship should remain consistent when
the system operates in a certain state (faulty or not).
Let us consider a monitoring framework comprised of K node
sensors, each of which generates a datastream. Denote by Xi :
N-R the datastream acquired by the ith sensor. Table 2 includes
the symbols used in the present analysis.
Let Oi;T0 ¼ fXiðtÞ; t ¼ 1;…; T0g and Oj;T0 ¼ fXjðtÞ; t ¼ 1;…; T0g be
the data sequence of the ith and jth sensors. In the following we
assume that their relationship is characterized by a process P
which is time-invariant or that every state of the system (e.g.
nominal, fault, attack, etc.) can be approximated by a sequence of
models even if it is time-variant (e.g. through a Markov process in
the parameter space).
Therefore, to construct a model for their relationship, we
consider the general discrete-time linear MISO structure [30]:
AðzÞXiðtÞ ¼
Xm
j ¼ 1
BðzÞ
FðzÞXjðtÞþ
CðzÞ
DðzÞdðtÞ; ð1Þ
where d(t) is an independent and identically distributed random
variable accounting for the noise, m is the number of inputs, z is
the time-shift operator while AðzÞ;BðzÞ;CðzÞ;DðzÞ and F(z) represent
z-transfer functions, whose parameter vectors are θA; θB; θC ; θD and
θF respectively. Consequently an element f θ in the approximating
model familyMðθÞ is fully described with a θARp which comprises
the above parameter vectors. Following the logic of [31], we create
an ensemble of dynamic models (e.g. ARX, ARMAX, and OE) with
various orders and select the one which best ﬁts the datastreams
(i.e. lowest reconstruction error) while low-order models are
preferred. The model search algorithm minimizes a robustiﬁed
quadratic prediction error criterion. It should be mentioned that
the methodology is independent of the selected model type and
can be applied unaltered.
The utilization of linear models ensures that the regularity
assumptions imposed by [30,32] are satisﬁed. Thus, our frame-
work is placed on a solid mathematical background despite the
introduced model bias J f θP J suggesting that the underlying
distribution of the parameters is a multivariate Gaussian (the bias
here is seen as a time-invariant “difference” between the predicted
and the true process). However various models are needed to
describe a speciﬁc source of data, the number and the connections
of which is not known a priori. A hidden Markov model is
appropriate for dealing with this type of bias since it can break
the problem into a speciﬁc number of states which are connected
in a probabilistic way (Fig. 1).
We model the sequence of the model parameters by means of
an HMM:
HθT ¼ fN; P;A; πg; ð2Þ
where N are the states, P is the probability density functions with
respect to each state, θT are the parameters of the training
sequence, A is the state transition probability matrix and πis the
initial state distribution. The dynamic model space is searched
based on the log-likelihood criterion during the operational life.
The model which produces the highest log-likelihood is selected
out of the library which is created off-line. The following1 http://www.swim-suit.aero/swimsuit/.
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subsections explain the usage of the HMM modeling approach in
the context of fault diagnosis.
3.1. Hidden Markov models
Hidden Markov models constitute an extension of the discrete
Markov processes while the main focus is placed on real-world
problems. HMMs have been proposed in [33], where the observation
is a probabilistic function of the state. The resulting model includes
two stochastic processes, one of which is not observable (hidden) and
can only be observed through another set of stochastic processes
which produce the sequence of observations. In an HMM the states
are referred to as hidden because the system we wish to model may
have underlying causes that cannot be observed.
An HMM is characterized by the following components:
 the number of states N;
 the probability density function associated with each state mod-
elled as a mixture of Gaussians (GMM), PðxjθÞ ¼ PKk ¼ 1 pkpðxj θðkÞÞ,
where pk's are the mixture weights, x is a continuous-valued data
vector (e.g. measurements or features), θðkÞ represents the kth
component of the vector, θ¼ ½σ; μ , pðxj θðkÞÞ ¼ 1= 2πð Þd=2 j
σk je1=2 xμkð Þ
t
σ  1k ðxμkÞ;
 the state transition probability matrix A¼ faijg where entry aij
represents the probability of moving from state j at time t to state i
at time tþ1. For the case where the systemmay transit to any state
at a given time instant, we have aij40; 8 i; j. In case some
transitions are not allowed, the respective aijs should be set to zero; the initial state distribution π ¼ fπi g, where πi corresponds to
the probability that the HMM starts in state i, i.e.
πi ¼ p½Si;1r irN.
3.2. HMM Training
Model parameters, that is, the transition probabilities, emission
probabilities and the initial state probability need to be adjusted so as
to maximize the probability of the observed sequence and ade-
quately represent the training set. The Baum–Welch algorithm [34] is
a method that uses an iterative approach and provides a solution to
this problem. It starts with preassigned probabilities and tries to
adjust them based on the observed sequences in the training dataset.
The HMM parameters can be initialized to predetermined
values or to a constant before applying the Baum–Welch algo-
rithm. As the path taken is not known, the algorithm counts the
number of times each component is used when the observed set of
elements in the training sequence is given to the present HMM.
Each iteration of the algorithm includes two steps, the Expectation
step (E Step) and the Maximization step (M Step). The Maximiza-
tion step uses the counts of the number of times an element is
seen at a state and the number of times a transition occurs
between two states which were obtained from the Expectation
step to update the transition and emission probabilities in order to
maximize the performance. The algorithm stops when the con-
vergence criterion is satisﬁed (the log-likelihood between subse-
quent iterations is under a threshold, j Ltþ1Lt joTViterbi) or when
the maximum number of permitted iterations is reached.
3.3. Log-likelihood computation of unknown data
The Viterbi algorithm is used to ﬁnd the most probable path taken
across the states in the HMM. The algorithm checks all possible paths
leading to a state and gives the most probable based on dynamic
programming. It keeps track of the best state used during a transition
using pointers. The most probable path is found by moving through
the pointers backwards starting from the end state to the start state.
Sometimes we may obtain more than one path as the most probable;
in such cases one path is randomly selected. The Viterbi Algorithm is
analytically explained in [35].
3.4. The dependency graph
While datastreams coming from each element of the power
network are all correlated to some extent we need to reduce the
number of functional dependencies to the most relevant ones for
reducing the computational cost. In fact, poorly correlated data-
streams reﬂect a weak functional dependency yielding to poor
performing models which may decrease the overall performance of
the FDS. The success of this approach may deﬁne also the applic-
ability of the concept to detect issues in the network with only a
small subset of information coming from a reduced number of nodes.
The ﬁrst stage of this preliminary step is the estimation of the
cross-correlations among the datastreams coming from all the K
power nodes. Afterwards, a dependency graph, which initially com-
prises all the possible relationships among the nodes, is pruned by
discarding those relations whose cross-correlation peak is below a
user-deﬁned threshold. The result is a reduced dependency Fig. 2
shows the reduced dependency graph of the IEEE 30 bus system
considered in the experimental section. For visibility reasons we
included data coming from six buses (1, 11, 18, 21 and 25). Arcs
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
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Fig. 1. A demonstration of the way the HMM operates and addresses the model bias inserted during the linear time invariant modeling phase.
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connecting CI elements represent highly-correlated functional
dependencies.
After early experimentations we decided to employ bus voltages
since they provide quite useful information for understanding the
state of the network. In the proposed methodology the likelihood
computed for bus i is weighted so that the decision upon its
datastream is a function of the statuses of the buses belonging to
the rest of the network. More precisely each bus is associated with
two likelihoods: Li is the one produced by HMM i and Lr;i is a
weighted sum of the likelihoods of the buses representing the rest of
the network: Lr;i ¼
P30
j ¼ 1;ja i
wi;j  Lj, where wi;j is the cross correlation
among buses i and j and Lj the likelihood produced by the HMM
associated with bus j. This way the algorithm is able to assess the
status of the CI network even when information from one bus is
missing or is identiﬁed as compromised. In addition a bias affecting a
statistical model does not impact the ﬁnal decision.
4. The fault identiﬁcation algorithm
The training phase of the proposed methodology creates one
HMM per existing functional relationship within the network
under monitoring. During testing one examines the probability
generated by the created HMMs. Finally the system computes the
discrepancy between the probabilities collected during the train-
ing phase and the ones produced during the testing one. The class
with the lowest discrepancy is assigned to the unknown data.
Based on the speciﬁc logic we essentially try to quantify the
statistical similarity between the unknown data and the one
available during training. The proposed approach is motivated by
the fact that faults, denial of service attacks and integrity threats
are associated with network data exhibiting different patterns,
thus belonging to diverse probabilistic spaces.
The fault identiﬁcation algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
We assume a training set corresponding to Oi;T0 ;1r irN associated
with each normal data. We compute the d model coefﬁcients over a
predeﬁned window of the sensor measurements of size M. They are
used to train the HMM which is to characterize the nominal class. In
order to identify the HMMs with the best classiﬁcation capabilities, we
build a variety of HMMs with different parameters (number of states
and Gaussian components) and we select the HMM based on the
highest recognition rate criterion.
When unknown data is processed, it is ﬁrst windowized and
the model coefﬁcients with respect to each window are computed
and inserted into the trained HMM. The log-likelihood is then
calculated for window Wj and its identity is determined by
computing its difference from the log-likelihoods seen during
training. The classiﬁcation process is shown Fig. 3.
5. Experimental framework and implemented attacks
As an experimental framework we have used AMICI, a novel
Assessment platform for Multiple Interdependent Critical Infrastruc-
tures [36]. AMICI uses simulation for the physical components and the
emulation testbed, EPIC, based on Emulab [37,38] in order to recreate
the cyber part of CIs, e.g., BGP routing protocols, SCADA (Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition) servers, corporate network. The use of
simulation for the physical layer is a very reasonable approach due to
small costs, the existence of accurate models and the ability to conduct
experiments in a safe environment. The argument for using emulation
for the cyber components is that the study of the security and
resilience of computer networks would require the simulation of all
the failure related functions, most of which are unknown in principle.
Whenever real-time simulation is used, models run in a
discrete time-domain that is closely linked to the clock of the
OS. This means that the simulated model runs at the same rate as
the actual physical system. We use generic PCs with multitasking
OSs to run the real-time software simulation units. Our choice to
use Simulink Coder based on well-established Matlab-based soft-
ware as Matpower [39] and Matdyn [40] to produce the simula-
tors. An important aspect in this sense is the choice of the model
Total Power Generation
Bus 1 Voltage    Bus 11 Voltage
Bus 21 Voltage   Bus 25 Voltage
  Bus 18 Voltage
Fig. 2. The reduced dependency graph depicts the existing relevant relations
among the elements of the power network. Only relationships with correlation
above a certain threshold may be considered (here Threshold¼0.2).
Algorithm 1. The fault diagnosis algorithm which models the relationship between two datastreams by means of an HMM.
1. Build the HMM representing the nominal class, HN ¼ fSN ; PN ;AN ; πNg from the vectors of parameters θ1…θd each of which associated
with a linear dynamic model applied to the training data Oi;T0 ;i ¼ 1;…;d windowized using length M overlapping by M1;
2 Windowize the incoming novel data as above, which results in windows W ¼W1…Wx;
repeat
3: j¼ 1;
4: Compute the parameter vectors of the jth dynamic model θj with respect to Wj;
5: Compute the log likelihood LWj ¼ Pðθ1…θj jHfN Þ;
6: Compute the log likelihood Lr ¼
X30
k ¼ 1;kaN
wk  Lk;
7: Compute D ¼ ðLWj þLr;Wj LTrÞ; LTr ¼ fLN ; Lf ; Ldos; Lintg;
8: Find minðDÞ and assign to Wj the class with the lowest discrepancy;
9: j¼ jþ1;

until FDS turned OFF;
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execution rate, also known as the simulation step, where we
veriﬁed that the output of real-time simulation reproduces as
accurately as possible the real-world process.
From the simulation point of view each model is seen as a set of
inputs and outputs. These are mapped to an internal memory region
(I/O MEM ) that is read/written by other software modules as well.
This way, AMICI enables the implementation of Programable Logic
Controllers (PLCs) and the interaction with remotely software model
by mapping messages from Remote Procedure Call (RPC) messages to
Modbus and vice-versa , i.e., can exchange model values as measured
voltage. Interaction with other simulation units is enabled by imple-
menting not only RPC server-side operations but client-side calls as
well. These data is exchange through our emulated network which
brings our implementation as close as possible to real infrastructures.
5.1. Cyber-attacks
We classify attacks on the cyber-part of C-P systems into integrity
attacks and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks . The above
classiﬁcation is based on the resources available to the attacker, skill
level and his expertise in C-P system operation and control. If the
attacker has knowledge a priori on the operation of the entire system,
he would be able to produce a much greater threat. Thereby, with this
knowledge, an attacker would be in a better position to compromise a
substation that is very vital to the power infrastructure.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are one of the most
effective attacks that modern CIs must cope with. Massively
distributed DDoS attacks rely on thousands of infected hosts to
ﬂood the victim with a large number of packets and consume its
resources, mostly communications bandwidth. Consequently, the
victim is left without communications resources and it effectively
looses control over remotely controlled installations. Moreover,
the response strategy for the controller during a DDoS attack is the
last received data/signal to be treated as current command:
cðtÞ ¼
cpastðtÞ ATDoS
crealðtÞ =2TDoS
(
ð3Þ
Our focus on the integrity attacks is placed on replay attacks. All
messages contain time-varying information which reﬂects the
current system status and actions required. Attackers can catch
some messages and deliver them afterwards. This kind of attacks
can also lead power grid control to malfunctions. Finally, if the
attacker has initiated the data recording at t1 and ﬁnished at t2,
then the reply attack can be illustrated as
cðtÞ ¼ cðt0Þ;where t1o ¼ t0o ¼ t2 & t4t2 ð4Þ
6. Experiments
The experimental section provides details regarding (a) the
simulation and emulation environment used in the current study,
(b) the dataset coming from the experimental test-bed, and (c) the
parametrization of the proposed approach as well as its perfor-
mance analysis.
6.1. The simulation and emulation environment
The used implementation framework is illustrated ﬁg 4 which
shows (a) simulated the physical components of a power grid and
(b) emulated the cyber elements. The power grid integrated in this
experiment is the well-known IEEE 30-bus model (see Fig. 1 for its
graphical representation). It includes (a) 6 generator buses, (b) 5
Fig. 4. The experimentation architecture.
Fig. 3. Fault identiﬁcation based on the nominal HMM where the class of the unknown data is determined by the distance in the log-likelihood space.
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connecting buses, and (c) 20 buses where the consumers are connected
buses. A few busses can simultaneously have a generator and a
consumer connected to them. Moreover, the sampling rate (simulation
step) of the simulated model is 21ms which it the time to calculate its
parameters including the interaction with the emulated environment.
The cyber-part includes (a) 6 routers (Cisco 6503), which have
four Gigabit experimental interfaces and one control interface
(emulation) and (b) 6 virtual PCs (HP Proliant GL380p), which have
Xeon(R) 4 CPUs@2.40 GHz, 3GB RAM, two Gigabit experimental
interfaces and one control interface. They were used as experi-
mental nodes (attackers and simulated elements) and their oper-
ating system is FreeBSD8.2.
Finally, a network measurement reveals an average Round Trip
Time (RTT) below 3 ms. This means that the implementation
exhibits the operational behavior of real communications systems
where the delivery of high-speed messages must be below the
maximum limit of 10ms, as stated by the IEEE 1646-2004 standard
[41] on communications delays in substation automation.
6.2. The training scenarios
The detection method presented in Section 4 needs a training
process before being able to provide real-time results. The data
from the training scenario helps as an input to establish the
legitimate and malicious states of the exchanging data from the
PLCs to controller. The experimental scenario sets the normal state
of the power grid. Limited ﬂuctuations in consumed load are
present without faults and/or attacks.
6.3. FDS parameterization
The HMMs have been conﬁgured in a fully connected topology
(ergodic HMM), which means that the algorithm permits every
possible transition across states. Lastly, the distribution of each
state is modeled by a GMM with a diagonal covariance matrix.
We employed the Torch framework2 during both learning and
validation phase. The maximum number of k-means iterations for
cluster initialization was set to 50 while the Baum–Welch algorithm
used to estimate the transition matrix was bounded to 100 iterations
with a threshold of 0.001 between subsequent iterations. The number
of explored states ranges from 3 to 10 while the number of Gaussian
components used to build each GMM comes from the {2, 4, 8, 16, 32,
64, 128, 256 and 512} set. We did not apply any data pre-processing
techniques, such as normalization, to avoid any kind of information
loss. The particular parameters refer on both single and universal
HMMmodeling. Finally the window lengthM was 100, a value which
provided satisfactory reconstruction error during the preliminary
experimental phase.
The correlation threshold (see Fig. 2), was chosen via a sensitivity
analysis focusing on the fact that there should not be isolated parts in
the network. A malicious event including attacks, faults, etc. may
appear at any infrastructure node, thus data coming from all the
nodes should be collected and processed. However their signiﬁcance
alters according to the weights of wj of the correlation map.
We carried out a thorough experimental procedure to evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed method. The following ﬁgures of
merit were used [5]:
 False positive rate (FP): it counts the number of times the
algorithm detects a malicious situation in the datastreamwhen
there is not.
 False negative rate (FN): it counts the number of times the
algorithm does not detect a malicious situation in the data-
stream even though there is.
 Detection delay (DD): it measures the delay in number of
samples for detecting a malicious situation.
The main attack scenario was a replay attack (Section 5) against
the data transmitted from BUS 20 to the controller (see Fig. 5). We
used the tcpdump3 tool for recording the data trafﬁc and tcpre-
play4 tool for replaying previously captured network trafﬁc. Dur-
ing this attack we executed faults and DDoS attacks against other
buses in order to see how our method work when the provided
information is limited. The DDoS attack was against a router
within a given period of time where most/all of the available
bandwidth was consumed. Therefore partially or none data
reached the controller. The DDoS attack was implemented by
using the iperf tool.5 In this case the algorithm discards the
attacked bus and infers the state of the system using information
coming from the rest of the network.
Each attack had a duration of more than 30,000 samples (the
sampling rate of the simulated model is 20 ms). The fault diagnosis
Fig. 5. The operation of the proposed algorithm during an integrity attack. In the beginning the bus voltage ﬂuctuates due to two faults occurring on neighbor buses while
the integrity attack starts at the 220th second and causes a drop in the probability of the HMM. The attack is detected with a delay of 6 samples.
2 Torch Machine Learning Library, available at http://www.torch.ch/.
3 A command line network sniffer, available at http://www.tcpdump.org/.
4 Utility for editing and replaying previously captured network trafﬁc, available at
http://tcpreplay.appneta.com/.
5 Tool to measure network performance, available at http://iperf.fr/.
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framework is trained on data coming from the normal modality of
total length of 15,000 samples while the rest were used for testing.
The system models the overall power and the load of each bus.
Model training required 14 days on a PC running Windows 7 with
double core processor and 32 GB of RAM while testing was done in
real time since only computations of log-likelihoods are included
which are computationally inexpensive.
The model order is determined by minimizing a quadratic
prediction error criterion. The model family providing the lowest
error was ARX while the model ﬁts the data in real time. Finally,
the one provided the best performances was the following ARX
(2,2):
XiðtÞ ¼ a1Xiðt1Þþa2Xiðt2Þþb1Xjðt1Þþb2Xjðt2Þ ð5Þ
where a1¼0.5, a2¼0.2, b1¼0.1, b2¼0.3. It should be noted that for
a different network another model may be proven optimal by the
process explained in Section 3. The ﬁgures of merit are computed
both on data coming from the nominal and malicious states. They
are tabulated in Table 1.
6.4. Experimental results
Since the literature does not include an approach for fault
identiﬁcation in interdependent CIs, the method proposed here
was contrasted to the parity equation approach which represents
well the literature on fault detection [7,42]. Here we observe the
discrepancy between the process behavior and the process model
describing the nominal fault-free behavior. The threshold for
detecting a fault is set equal to the highest discrepancy on unseen
training data. In case the discrepancy surpasses the threshold, a
faulty situation is detected.
During our experimentations we used data coming from all the
nodes of the electrical network while all the malicious states were
correctly recognized. It should be mentioned that we used the
same training and testing sequences among the different methods
in order to achieve a fair comparison. In addition Table 1 provides
the FPs, FNs and detection delays with respect to every type of
network state for both methods. We can observe that the pro-
posed method offers superior ﬁgures of merits for all system states
including the nominal and the faulty ones. The metrics offered by
the proposed method are within quite low limits while the most
difﬁcult to detect are the integrity attacks (highest FP, FN and
delay). Conclusively the overall performance of the system is quite
promising especially when considering the degree of complexity
of the problem as well as the incorporation of two diverse and
interdependent CIs.
7. Conclusions
This work explained and thoroughly evaluated a novel frame-
work for identifying malicious situations appearing in the context
of interdepended CIs. The experimental set-up consisted of a
simulated IEEE 30 bus energy network operated via an emulated
Table 1
The detection results of the proposed and the parity equation methods in the
following format: proposed/parity. The ﬁgures of merit are averaged over the entire
dataset.
Test data type FP (%) FN (%) Detection delay (# of samples)
Nominal 0/13.4 –/– –/–
Overload (fault-free) 0/19.1 –/– –/–
Underload (fault-free) 0/15.9 –/– –/–
Fault –/– 0.5/12.7 8.6/57.2
DDoS –/– 0.2/8.5 2.1/17.2
Integrity –/– 1.1/17.5 2.5/62.7
Table 2
List of symbols.
Xi the stream of data acquired by the i-th sensor
Oi;T0 the data sequence of the i-th sensor for t ¼ 1;…; T0
P time-invariant process
d(t) independent and identically distributed random variable for noise
z time-shift operator
AðzÞ;BðzÞ;CðzÞ;DðzÞ and F(z) z-transfer functions, whose parameter vectors are θA; θB; θC ; θD and θF respectively
MðθÞ model family with parameters θ
HθT HMM trained on parameters θ coming from the interval t¼1,…,T
N number of states
P probability density function
A state transition probability matrix
π initial state distribution
pk mixture weight
σ variance of a Gaussian
μ mean of a Gaussian
aij the probability of moving from state j at time t to state i at time tþ1
Li likelihood of HMM i
Lr;i weighted sum of the likelihoods of the buses excluding bus i
wi;j the cross correlation between a bus i and bus j
K number of sensors
D distance measured in the probabilistic space
M data window size
W data window
d number of LTI model coefﬁcients
c(t) data value at time t
Z number of fault types
m number of inputs
fi fault of type i, iAZ; iAf1;…; Zg
k Gaussian component
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telecommunication network. The proposed method models the
sequence of the parameters of LTI models by means of an HMM,
while the decision regarding the state of the system of CIs
(nominal, under DDos or integrity attack) is made using a distance
metric in the probabilistic space. An interesting feature of the
algorithm is its ability to provide a system state evenwhen a bus is
down or under attack using a correlation map of the network.
After extensive experimentations, it was shown that the perfor-
mance of the system is encouraging as measured using false
positive rate, false negative rate and detection delay.
We aim to extend this work by cooperating with a smart grid
operator and apply it on real-world data. In addition we aim to
generalize the method by designing a scheme for detecting data
which are not statistically similar to the ones seen during training
and thus may comprise new kinds of malicious situations. The
similarity could be based on a statistical distance metric, e.g.
Kullback–Leibler divergence and when an adequate amount of
new data is gathered, a new class of malicious events can be
determined. We believe that such a module would be a great help
while the operators need to analyze a malicious event and deduct
the vulnerabilities of their infrastructure which lead to it. Another
interesting direction is the development of a mechanism for
correcting the decisions made by the fault identiﬁcation algorithm
based on the ordering in time, i.e. faults of unreasonable duration or
improbable series of faults. Finally we wish to study the occurrence
of multiple faults at the same time by evaluating a number of
hypotheses equal to every possible combination of fault classes.
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